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Retributive justice in wicked regimes
By Dan Markel ℵ
I. Background
Over the last two years, I began a long project trying to figure out the scope of
our moral obligations to the criminal law within liberal democracies. 1 As
someone with retributivist leanings, my basic take was that retributivists need to
forge a cold peace with democracy; making peace with democracy, I reasoned,
was sometimes harder to do for retributivists, at least on the standard conception
of retributivism (manifested by Michael Moore and Doug Husak, among others).
Accordingly, even though I basically agreed there are good reasons to be
parsimonious about what the criminal law should look like when occupying a
legislative or voting role (that is, there are good reasons to be a negative legal
moralist), 2 there were competing and usually overwhelming considerations at
play when citizens have to occupy other roles within liberal democracies.
Specifically, I argued that officials of a retributivist bent have certain pro tanto
obligations toward enforcing certain kinds of criminal laws (ex post) even if
such laws would not have found favor in their eyes at the legislative (ex ante)
stage. Similarly, I contended that citizens had moral obligations (again, in a pro
tanto sort of way) to conform their conduct to certain criminal laws even if they
would have rejected such laws (on reasonable grounds) ex ante as voters. And
perhaps most controversially, I also argued that citizens even have to offer
reasonable assistance to law enforcement for certain kinds of criminal laws.
So what were these kinds of criminal laws that generated new moral obligations
(to enforce; offer reasonable assistance to law enforcement; conform one’s
conduct to?) And what was special about liberal democracies that laws that
would not otherwise pass scrutiny could all of a sudden trigger these new moral
obligations to enforce, conform, or render reasonable assistance?
I tried in some detail to elaborate an account of political obligation arising from
liberal democratic conditions that could explain the grounds for this set of pro
tanto obligations. And after doing that, I adumbrated a few categories of laws
that I thought made sense in terms of trying to map these obligations. For
example, I distinguished between criminal laws consistent with core liberal
values (as opposed to libertarian values), and those criminal laws that were flatly
illiberal. And then I addressed what I called permissibly dumb criminal laws and
contrasted them with spectacularly dumb criminal laws.
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Negative legal moralism basically holds that it is a necessary condition for
something to be immoral for it to be criminalized. Positive legal moralism is
usually associated with the idea that immoral behavior provides a sufficient
condition to be criminalized. One variation on both ideas would be to make
these presumptive conditions; so, on this view, negative legal moralists believe
that immoral behavior is presumptively required for some act or inaction to be
criminalized.
1

Putting them together, I realized that there are vast numbers of what I call
permissibly dumb but not illiberal laws, and that is a category of lawmaking that
may well dominate our penal landscape, at least in liberal democracies. In other
words, we have a wide array of criminal laws whose underlying value may not
be about castigating behavior that is morally wrong in some institutionally
independent way – think of prohibitions on guns or drug possession alone or
even sitting in a park without a minor. 3 And yet, we have defeasible obligations
(or so I argue) to respect even misguided criminal laws, largely because there
was some “moral magic” that liberal democracy could perform under the right
conditions. Whether those conditions obtain right now in states like Canada or
the US is a harder question. And even in liberal democracies, there are limits on
the capacities of moral magic.
Indeed, with respect to limits, one of the things I spent some time working on in
this project (entitled) was sentencing, and specifically the extent to which we
had moral obligations to defer to the legislative branch when either that branch
or others were inflicting harsh (or even light) sentences for permissibly dumb
but not illiberal laws.
To summarize my views crudely, and with some examples to help illuminate the
intuitions, consider the following framework.
First, a criminal ban on activities that threatened light punishments would itself
be subjected to a moral version of rational basis with bite scrutiny. Accordingly,
if the conduct rule could not be justified based on the moral equivalent to
rational basis with bite (a term I defined in a somewhat different and more
demanding way than it is used in typical American constitutional discourse),
then there would be no moral obligation to conform one’s conduct to the
specific law, nor would there be a pro tanto obligation for citizens to render
reasonable assistance to law enforcement associated with that law, or to enforce
the law from an official’s perspective (or at least most officials’ perspectives
where they had substantial enforcement discretion). So, a ban on eating on the
subway would pass muster here (in a well-working liberal democracy) but a ban
on chess would be unlikely to survive (the moral equivalent of rational basis
with bite scrutiny), even if the punishment was small.
Next, if a criminal law tied a moderate punishment to a criminal prohibition,
then it would have to be justified along the basis of intermediate scrutiny (from a
moral perspective). For example, my sense is that a ban on eating on the subway
punishable by a trivial amount of prison would not pass intermediate scrutiny,
but gun possession laws probably would. Crimes threatening substantial
punishments, however, would have to survive the moral equivalent of strict
scrutiny, and in this respect, I am doubtful that incarceration greater than a year
would be adequately justified for drug or gun possession laws, but would be a
reasonable basis for many mala in se crimes.
This framework promises a sliding scale of scrutiny for crimes based on the
amount of punishment the state in question would impose. If the law did not
over-punish relative to the merits of the underlying crime, then pro tanto
obligations could be generated through democratic processes and that we could
find ourselves laboring under obligations to conform or enforce a whole array of
(permissibly) dumb but not illiberal laws. On the flip side, if criminal laws were

3

http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/27/nyregion/lawrence-williams-convictedof-assault-is-exonerated.html?ref=todayspaper

either illiberal or spectacularly dumb, then they would trigger no obligations to
conform, enforce, or render assistance to law enforcement.
All this leaves out over 200 pages of commentary but the gist of it is to suggest
that retributivists have to learn to tolerate and even grudgingly make peace with
democracy’s capacity to generate new moral obligations. 4 This need to make
peace is especially true over the battles of mala prohibita crimes.
If the preceding account (or its lengthier forbears) is correct, and there is a basis
for presumptive political obligations to attach in some regimes, then what
follows for regimes unsaddled by the weight and wonder of liberal democracy?
My primary concern in this little essay is to try to sketch out (however
incompletely) what implications there might be for wicked regimes from my
more pluralist account of the intersection of retributive justice with criminal law
within good liberal democratic regimes.
So let me suggest a few claims but before I do, let me begin by emphasizing that
my focus is on really bad regimes: North Korea, Syria, etc. In such wicked
regimes, what are the moral obligations of persons vis-à-vis domestic criminal
laws?

II. Philosophical Anarchism for Everyone (Outside Liberal Democracies)?
It’s tempting to say that the moral magic performed by liberal democracies is
absent in wicked regimes. On this view, states that lack the normative legitimacy
to generate new moral obligations cannot expect citizens (or persons more
generally) to conform to their criminal laws in ways that don’t otherwise
accurately track their moral obligations. Put differently, regardless of what the
actual criminal law is in those regimes, such laws don’t much reduce our moral
obligations in terms of how we must act with each other. So, for example, the
pre-institutional reasons I have for not murdering you ought to be compelling
me not to murder you regardless of whether there’s a law on the books with
adequate punishment to scare me into submission. This insistence on a freefloating set of moral norms that guide our behavior is basically consistent with
the position of philosophical anarchism. 5
Accordingly, the fact that a law would tell us to forbear from theft or murder is
of little significance because we already had excellent reasons to avoid that
action, and those reasons should guide our behavior, not the mere fact that the
law says so. Where the balance of moral reasons weighs in one direction, and
that direction is at odds with the law, the philosophical anarchist says, so much
the worse for the law. Denying that moral magic exists, the anarchist position is
that the law holds no independent moral authority. 6 Importantly, however,
4

That said, we can always lobby or vote to re-make the criminal law in
accordance with the negative legal moralism of someone like Doug Husak or
Michael Moore.
5
“Philosophical anarchists maintain that we (or that most of us) have no
political obligations, that all arguments purporting to establish general political
obligations fail” (A John Simmons 2009 SSRN piece on associative political
obligations http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1344435)
6
This stands at odds with the view I adopted in RJDDC, where I argued that in
well-working liberal democracies, we have presumptive political obligations
that call us to conform to (many) criminal laws that are not focused on
identifying and castigating moral wrongs. Markel, RJDDC.

philosophical anarchism doesn’t require blithe indifference to the value
institutions may play, even in wicked regimes. Even wicked regimes may have
stop signs or traffic laws that one should conform to, at least most of the time,
according to philosophical anarchists. 7
But, to use a familiar hypo, the anarchist position won’t amount to providing a
pro tanto reason to stop at the stop sign in the middle of the desert when it’s
clear that there’s no one around for miles. And that’s true of this viewpoint
whether you’re in a liberal democracy or a wicked regime.
The question then is how should one live (with others) in a wicked regime? Do
we have any pro tanto reasons to “respect” criminal laws in such regimes when
the demands of those criminal laws take us beyond the philosophical anarchist
position?
To ask the question is to assume, perhaps without adequate argument, that we
can come to agreement over what the philosophical anarchist position would be
on matters that themselves are contestable. 8 Many anarchists are skeptical or
downright hostile to vice crimes for example. But at the same time,
philosophical anarchism is not intrinsically encouraging of “vice.” After all, I
might believe that I should not pay for sex (because such activity is in tension
with my view of the good life) but that others may have good and different
reasons to do so, and that, on balance, the state should get out of the bedroom of
its citizens. Similarly, I might not like the idea of being vulnerable to the mindaltering influence of alcohol or drugs but I could recognize that others could
safely and properly enjoy these effects under the right conditions. All this is to
say that philosophical anarchism cannot speak with one voice on the full gamut

7

For example, our leading philosophical anarchist, John Simmons, writes that
we “should (normally) perform as required or forbidden by law when (a) the
acts in question are also required or forbidden by natural morality; (b) the acts
are of general types that are not naturally required or forbidden, but where
context makes them so (as, e.g., in consequence of a scheme of coordination,
such as is accomplished by some traffic laws); (c) natural morality leaves open
the detailed content of some moral duty, which can legitimately be filled out by
agreement or social conventions (as might be true of, e.g., the duties relating to
property or contracts); (d) we have good moral reason of a weaker (i.e.,
nonduty) sort so to act and no more weighty reasons to do otherwise.”
A. John Simmons, The Duty to Obey and Our Natural Moral Duties, in
CHRISTOPHER HEATH WELLMAN & A. JOHN SIMMONS, IS
THERE A DUTY TO OBEY THE LAW? 191 n.5 (R.G. Frey ed., 2005).
8
For example, is there a clear position from the philosophical anarchist position
on whether one should refrain from paid sex work (or paying for sex); gambling
or providing a gambling house; consuming recreational drugs or providing them
to others (assuming one can do so in a way that respects the autonomy and
safety of others)? Some philosophers who embrace a roughly anarchical position
(and they are negative legal moralists in the context of criminal law) think
criminal law should not be involved in the regulation of sex between consenting
adults, and some philosophers of this sort are also suspicious of other vice
crimes, such as gambling, drugs, or alcohol regulation/prohibition. Consider two
leading criminal law theorists: Michael Moore, consistent with his negative legal
moralism and what I take to be his philosophical anarchism, is sharply critical of
many criminal laws regulating sex. See Moore, Placing Blame 1997. Doug
Husak has adopted a similar view, based on similar reasons, of hostility toward
most drug possession laws. Husak, Drugs and Rights.

of criminalization choices available, whether in a liberal democracy or in a
wicked regime.
Still, there is much that philosophical anarchism, and its cousin, negative legal
moralism, 9 can require or prohibit (such as the easy case of murder), and when
that’s the case, some crimes, particularly those in wicked regimes, will squarely
stand in tension with the philosophical anarchist view. So how are we to deal
with harder cases, for example, where the criminal law requires a person to act
immorally? Say the state punishes persons for accessing the NYTimes from
their computer and it also punishes those who fail to report others for accessing
the NYTimes. 10
A. Conformity Obligations
Remember, that, on my view, such laws in liberal democracies would be
illiberal laws, and akin to spectacularly dumb criminal laws, they cannot
command conformity because they do not generate new moral obligations.
There might be prudential reasons to conform to them, or to enforce them, but
they lack the character of a pro tanto moral reason for action in and of
themselves. It would seem to follow ineluctably that the same categories of laws
(illiberal or spectacularly dumb) can generate no new moral obligations when
enacted in wicked regimes.
So what do we make of those laws in wicked regimes that, if they were in a
liberal democracy, would count as permissibly dumb but not illiberal? It was my
view that these laws are able to generate new moral obligations in liberal
democracies because of the way in which liberal democracies can create some
moral magic. Absent the moral magic performed by an account of political
obligation that makes sense within liberal democracies, there would be no
intrinsic value (or pro tanto reason) to conform to laws (applicable in wicked
regimes) that would have to be regarded as permissibly dumb but not illiberal
(within liberal democracies). So, just to use an example, if we could stipulate
that criminal bans on eating on the subway (using low sanctions) would be
permissibly dumb but not illiberal (within a liberal democracy), how would we
view that same law within, say, Syria?
To my mind, the answer is quite clear. Such laws are not capable of generating
new moral obligations on the part of citizens or subjects to that regime—at least
not based on the account of political obligation I gave, which only attached in
liberal democracies. 11
So to summarize briefly: in wicked regimes, citizens have obligations to
conform to those laws that already track our balance of moral reasons. That’s
9

Negative legal moralists hold that in order for X to be a criminal activity, X
should be morally wrong. The moral wrongness of an activity is thereby a
normatively necessary feature of criminal law. There are disputes over whether
the immorality of X is a sufficient condition for criminalization, but we will
leave that alone.
10
The other day, China actually banned access to the NYTimes website but they
may have done this through technical not legal means (West Coast not East
Coast Code).
11
The account I developed was not intended to be original; rather it was quite
self-consciously a pastiche drawn from, to varying degrees, contemporary
theorists including but not limited to Waldron, Shapiro, Hershovitz, Christiano,
and Estlund.

not different from citizens in good regimes. Conversely, they have no obligation
to conform to illiberal laws or spectacularly dumb laws -- just like citizens in
liberal democracies. The difference is that citizens of wicked regimes cannot be
said to have a presumptive political obligation. Accordingly, they have no
obligation to conform to laws that in liberal democracies would be permissibly
dumb but not illiberal. On the conformity front, that’s the main difference
between good and bad regimes.
B.

(Some questions about) Enforcement Obligations

What about enforcement obligations for officials in wicked regimes? This is a
surprisingly tricky issue. 12 It would help for us to distinguish between political
retributivism and comprehensive retributivism. 13
The former view understands criminal law principally as a relational matter, and
thus emphasizes the polity holding the offender to account through conviction
and punishment in response to the offense. The latter view by contrast is not
quite so relational; the focus is on whether moral wrongdoing is answered by the
wrongdoer’s eventual suffering.
So, vis-à-vis political retributivism, we should bear in mind, with Antony Duff,
among others, that the officials running the institutions of criminal justice are
claiming an authority to hold an offender to account by virtue of his offense
against the polity. A polity that cannot justify its rule because it (persistently)
demonstrates cruelty and disfigurement to those under its control, however,
looks just like a bunch of thugs with badges. The question that arises is whether
such thugs within a wicked regime have moral standing to call offenders to
account for their misdeeds?
On my view, they seemingly lack any such standing for condemning those who
violate laws that in liberal democracies would be permissibly dumb but not
illiberal. These laws, like illiberal or spectacularly dumb laws, have no capacity
to generate new moral obligations on behalf of citizens of the polity. But what
about those laws that are incontrovertibly good? Imagine there’s a murder
statute that fairly apportions punishment at 35 years of incarceration, or a rape
statute that assigns punishments we think are otherwise appropriate for the
offense, say 15 years. 14 Is it the case that even murderers and rapists cannot be
punished in such a regime?
I think this is an intolerably difficult question for political retributivists like
myself or Duff. I can’t speak for Duff, but one reason I would hesitate to answer
this question either way has to do with the quality of procedural justice used to
ascertain the guilt of the murderer or the rapist. (Normally, we assume such
conditions are satisfied in liberal democracies, but if they were not, then we’d
have no reason to be sanguine about the moral magic of liberal democracies.)

12

One reason is that the obligations of some officials may reasonably differ
from the obligations of others. Compare prison guards’ moral obligations to
police officers, prosecutors, judges, executive clemency decision-makers. I will
focus primarily on those officials having discretion to seek or forego
punishment. Cf. Markel, Making Punishment Safe for Democracy (section in
reply to Volokh).
13
I say more about these two kinds of retributive justice in RJDDC.
14
I want to avoid, for our purposes right now, problems where the punishment is
either grossly excessive or grossly lenient for the underlying offense.

So, if I could be reasonably certain that within a wicked regime the procedures
for ascertaining guilt were comparably reliable, I could imagine wearing the
robes of the comprehensive retributivist, who cares less about the relational dyad
between punisher and punished, and more about the moral desert of the
offender, 15 and whether that offender experiences condign suffering (or
punishment). 16
At its worst, the scenario I’m describing allows for the Nazis or Stalinists to
punish murderers, rapists, and thieves, and to set up or maintain institutions of
criminal justice so long as the institutions are respectably reliable as concerns
accuracy and proportionality of punishments. In terms of providing a rationale
for this position, my sense is that the perfect should not be the enemy of the
minimally good. Hence, so long as the preconditions having to do with accuracy
and proportionality in punishing a mala in se offense are satisfied, then the
chance to inflict some comprehensive retributive justice is not to be wasted. If
we can bend the arc of history toward (retributive) justice, we ought to.
Unfortunately, this view opens up many new questions that would not otherwise
be opened under the rubric of political retributivism. For example, imagine a
robber breaks his leg on his way out of the store he just jacked. Under traditional
political retributivism principles, which emphasize that punishment should be
apportioned based on the gravity of the offense, there’s no need to give him a
punishment discount in recognition of his suffering that he experienced.
Punishment is distinct from suffering in the political retributivism world. By
contrast, in the comprehensive retributivist world, we are motivated by the
principle that moral wrongdoing requires suffering as a response. The robbery
was not answered by the broken leg, but the robber experienced suffering
through the broken leg after the robbery. Doesn’t that count for something,
perhaps in the same way that a parent suffers when his crime leads to an
unintentional harm to his child? If the Nazi judge is apportioning punishment,
and is putting aside his anti-Semitic commitments and is otherwise just focused
on the punishment of the wrongdoer, do we want the official to come as close as
possible to being an agent of cosmic (or God’s) justice, or do we want the
punishment to still reflect something close to the (justifiable) norms of the
community during that period?
One reason for caution about comprehensive retributivism among officials in
wicked regimes has to do with the legality principle. For reasons elaborated
elsewhere, my sense is that comprehensive retributivism is basically unable to
explain or justify the norms associated with legality principles. 17 What matters
to a comprehensive retributivist is that there is moral wrongdoing and that such
wrongdoing is answered by suffering. The absence of a law is irrelevant if there
was culpable wrongdoing by an offender that is neither excused nor justified.

15

Moore, Placing Blame.
The political retributivist is normally somewhat indifferent to the matter of
suffering by an offender, because he is instead focused on the matter of
punishment. See Markel and Flanders, Bentham on Stilts (2010); Gray,
Punishment as Suffering (2010); Markel, Flanders & Gray, Beyond Experience
(2011). Punishment can be inflicted in ways that are reasonably objective across
persons, but suffering varies so idiosyncratically across persons that it’s hard to
make good comparisons to implement an equal suffering principle.
17
RJDDC.
16

So, how would we react if Nazi (or North Korean or Syrian) 18 prosecutors could
lock people up for offenses that are, let’s stipulate, mala in se, but that these
offenses were not adequately spelled out by law from the legislature, etc?
I find this line of inquiry quite difficult to address but my inclination is to think
that where political retributivism is impossible because of the illiberal and nondemocratic nature of the regime, the second best approach is basically one that
preaches philosophical anarchism for citizens and a qualified comprehensive
retributivism for officials, such that officials in wicked regimes still have a
warrant to punish incontrovertibly bad behavior up to the point that liberal
democracies would be morally permitted to do so.
This is different than being a full throated comprehensive retributivist because
those folks would need to punish with the same knowledge that we assume God
(or the cosmos) has. Accordingly, they would be able to sentence based on
information about bad acts that may not even be illegal, or good acts that are
ultimately irrelevant to the choice to commit the underlying crime.
C.

Assistance to Enforcement Obligations

In my companion papers, I argued that persons in liberal democracies have pro
tanto duties to reasonably assist law enforcement, and that these pro tanto duties
are somewhat easily outweighed or cancelled by competing considerations. Still,
I noted that the account of presumptive political obligation within liberal
democracies was still able to generate--with respect to incontrovertibly good
(mala in se) criminal laws, as with permissibly dumb but not illiberal laws-good reasons to render reasonable efforts to apprehend offenders of such laws.
Would the same hold true for wicked regimes? No, or not entirely. By my lights,
the duty to assist in the context of incontrovertibly good laws would still attach,
but only inasmuch as one had faith in the reliability of the investigative and
adjudicative proceedings and the substantive proportionality of the punishment.
By contrast, there would be no duty to assist with: i) spectacularly dumb laws ii)
illiberal laws, or iii) even those laws that would be permissibly dumb but not
illiberal in the context of liberal democracies.

D.

Alternative Accounts of Political Obligations

All along in this essay so far, I’ve been assuming that there is a gap between
political obligations in liberal democracies and wicked regimes. The gap arises
I think because of how wicked regimes are unable to avail themselves to the
arguments associated with natural duty and fairness that I relied upon in
sketching out the presumptive political obligation account in my companion
paper. When sketched out, this account explains the bases for thinking we are
defeasibly obligated to assist, enforce, or conform to a large but not
inexhaustible class of criminal laws. However, as is well known to those who
study the matter, one could have an alternative account of political obligation. If
that account of political obligation were adequate (ie, intellectually and morally
satisfactory), perhaps that alternative account of political obligation could
generate some new moral obligations, perhaps even ones that differ from the
tentative conclusions I’ve suggested here.
18

This isn’t to equate the crimes of the Nazis with those of the Syrians or the
North Koreans, only to note that they’re all well past the threshold for terrible
behavior.

Let’s tease this out and see if that’s right. There are a number of other grounds
sometimes invoked to suggest the creation of a content-independent political
obligation to conform one’s conduct to the law. Promise/consent is one familiar
one. Associative duties are a second, and acceptance of benefit is a third. 19
1. Explicit Consent/Promise
Even with wicked regimes, it is conceivable that people might pick up and move
there (perhaps to watch new grandchildren stuck there?), and by their express
and freely chosen actions and vows, decide that they want to take on the panoply
of laws that they weren’t otherwise obligated to prior to their voluntary consent
being rendered. 20 So, if Peter Promise moves to North Korea and says, I want to
throw my lot in with the Great Leader (or at least live under his rule), and I
hereby accept all the laws applicable to other North Koreans, then isn’t it likely
that Peter Promise’s obligations are different than someone who was kidnapped
and brought to North Korea against her will, or someone who lost the birthright
lottery and had the bad luck of being born in North Korea? In that sense, Peter
Promise might well have subscribed to a greater basket of obligations than Katy
Kidnap or Nate the Native Born Son. 21
Specifically, Peter Promise is now on the hook for (that is must assist, enforce,
or conform to) all the permissibly dumb but not illiberal laws that North Korea’s
borders might host. Importantly, however, Peter Promise still remains, on my
account, free from the obligations purportedly created by illiberal or
spectacularly dumb laws. Actually, to be more precise, Peter Promise is
permitted but not required to conform to those spectacularly dumb or illiberal
laws that are not other-regarding. But he may not assist in or enforce
spectacularly dumb or illiberal laws against others. Rather he must still act with
reasons that satisfy a minimal standard of scrutiny, and he must still forbear
from acting in a way that would wrong others. This is because his prior promise
to do X only provides a reason to do X if X is otherwise morally permissible. 22
But a promise to do X is of no moral significance if X is itself forbidden. And on
my view, it would be a pro tanto moral wrong to assist in the enforcement of or
enforcing a law that is itself spectacularly dumb or illiberal.
Something like the same logic would apply even when the grounds for political
obligation differ. But my sense is that the two other familiar potential grounds
for political obligation – associative duties and acceptance of benefits – are
inadequate to ground political obligation, and so, any duties to conform to or
enforce or assist in the enforcement of permissibly dumb but not illiberal laws
would have to be created by a separate grounds for obligation, mostly likely,
consent and/or promise. My skepticism toward associative duties and
acceptance of benefits as a grounds for political obligation is something I’ll only
19

[Say something about Raz and why I’m not addressing him].
This would overcome the traditional Humean objection observing that people
are frequently just born into their regimes, and thus can’t have realistically been
supposed to consent to the political authority of their lives in the presence of
inadequate exit options and the absence of formal procedures of acquiescence to
the political authorities.
21
Katy Kidnap is not much different than Nate the Native Born Son; the former
is brought there against her will and the latter is, arguendo, stuck there against
his will.
22
A murder of a person is not permitted just because one promised to do it
beforehand.
20

flesh out briefly since the arguments against them are quite powerful and have
already been rehearsed in the relevant literature.
2.
Associative duties are duties said to be created by virtue of a thick or longstanding relationship with another person or group of persons; these duties are
said by their proponents to exist independently of the voluntariness associated
with the creation of the special relationship that ostensibly grounds the
obligation. Some think these duties arise to family members, friends, or
countrymen. 23 According to one prominent exponent: “Political association, like
family or friendship and other forms of association more local and intimate, is
itself pregnant of obligation.” 24 My own quick view is that absent voluntariness
or requirements grounded in reasonableness and fairness (such as the account I
basically favor in the context of liberal democracy), there is no way for
associative duties to generate, or to continue Dworkin’s metaphor, birth the
moral magic needed to create new moral obligations that would require persons
within wicked regimes to conform to those dumb but not illiberal laws that
would survive scrutiny within a liberal democracy.
Some people have tried to defend associative duties by reference to the
conceptual nature of what it means to be a citizen within a polity to a
government (e.g., Macpherson/Pitkin), but these conceptual claims just bury
normative arguments that won’t actually die; after all, we are entitled to know
why citizens have these claimed obligations to polities. As John Simmons notes,
it’s not as if we don’t understand the coherence of the position of rebels or
anarchists and the reason we understand the coherence of their position even if
we don’t necessarily embrace their position is because we understand their
underlying claim that we are not invariably obligated absent a good account of
what should motivate us to accept our independently created obligations. 25
Similarly, the claim that descriptively many people feel a sense of political
obligation based on their associative duties to their fellow citizens cannot
ground an answer to the normative question of whether one citizen ought to
have a political obligation based on their associations with fellow citizens within
a polity. Again, Simmons unearths the unconvincing assumptions in the
argument (associated with Margaret Gilbert) quickly: “The mere fact that
individuals refer to "our" government and have a vague feeling of indebtedness
to "our" country should not, of course, lead us to believe that those individuals
in fact have (or even really believe they have) political obligations. Confused,
oppressed, or unthinking "feelings of obligation" are too common a feature of
our moral lives to make reasonable such leaps of faith.” 26
A final sense in which associative duties are said to be grounded is through the
development of reliance interests. If A regularly goes along with B and C to do
X activity, his doing X may seem to create reliance interests that B and C can be
assured of his continued doing of X. But this is too thin a reed to lean on. I may
23

Proponents of this view include Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire 1986 at 206;
John Horton, In Defense of Associative Political Obligations, 54 Political
Studies 427-443 (2006). In the criminal law context, Antony Duff has endorsed
this associative duties model as a grounds for political obligation. See his
response to me in Va J. Crim L. 2012.
24
Dworkin 1986: 206
25
Simmons, 2009, ssrn piece.
26
Id. at 13. (Simmons 2009).

have had an overdetermined number of prudential reasons for conforming to the
law of the polity of X-esia, but at no point should continued conformity be relied
upon merely because I did it before. Even if I have committed to taking a walk
at 7am every morning for myself, that can’t be said to generate a reliance
interest by others in my taking a walk at 7am. 27
In short, accounts in favor of associative political obligations are unpersuasive
even when they are situated within liberal democracies. The idea that wicked
regimes should benefit from associative political obligations is even harder to
accept. If persons in wicked regimes lack obligations to conform to dumb but
not illiberal laws because they lack associative political obligations, then it
would also follow that such persons have no associative political obligations to
assist with the enforcement of those dumb but not illiberal laws. Likewise,
officials would lack grounds to enforce dumb but not illiberal laws inasmuch as
those grounds were tied to an account based on associative duties.
3. Acceptance of Benefits
I turn next and last to an account of political obligation based on gratitude,
which I will hastily conflate with the view that obligations can arise from the
acceptance of benefits. The general view by proponents of such a view is that
those of us who accept benefits from the state are obligated to cooperate with
those who bestow those benefits. On its face, this seems like a difficult
proposition to embrace. As critics of this view pointed out, if someone throws a
newspaper at my front door, even repeatedly, that should probably earn my
thank you, but not necessarily my money. 28 Even if the benefits are accepted
willingly and continuously, and even if the benefits are not trivial, but rather are
essential to one’s life, well-being, and security, 29 it’s not clear why gratitude
should be cashed out in the currency of conformity to law, as opposed to other
ways in which gratitude can be expressed (verbal thank-you’s, baking banana
bread, knitting tea cozies.)
Accordingly, proponents of the gratitude-based obligation need a story to
convince us that conformity to law’s demands is the method by which we must
exhibit gratitude. They should also tell us why gratitude is required as opposed
to permitted or encouraged; after all, on their view, the lack of gratitude
becomes a wrong-type of the sort that could land one in prison when that
ingratitude is manifested by someone unwilling to abide by a dumb but not
illiberal law. In other words, normally, when someone is ungrateful for having
willingly received a benefit, we wouldn’t think that is the kind of unreasonable
behavior that would warrant criminal punishment. We might think that person is
a lout, and perhaps should be avoided at parties or perhaps gently rebuked, but
rarely do we think an ingrate is someone who, by dint of their ungratefulness,
needs condemnation through conviction and the hard treatment of fines or
prison. 30
Ok, so, if a gratitude based theory can’t ground political obligations for adhering
to dumb but not illiberal laws, that doesn’t mean that those who are grateful to
the state, even the wicked state, cannot choose to conform to these laws. They
can. And they might choose to do so based on a view that they are willing to
27
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conform through some form of consent/promise. But in this context of gratitude,
it’s a bit hard to stomach the view that an evil regime can earn fidelity and
respect for its dumb but not illiberal laws simply by, say, providing clean water
and maintaining traffic safety. In the personal context, for example, a mobster
might give turkeys to the poor or to politicians around Thanksgiving, but it
doesn’t translate that those groups should do the bidding of the mobster or even
not impede the actions of the mobster out of a felt sense of gratitude. Even if the
mobster gave a turkey (or even a house) to his drycleaner, the drycleaner should
be free from moral reproach if he decides that he doesn’t want the mobster’s
laundry to wash (which we can analogize as similar to a person in a wicked
regime choosing not to conform to those dumb but not illiberal laws that are
relatively costless to conform to).
Finally, I note that if gratitude cannot generate new obligations for conformity to
criminal law, then it similarly cannot perform the moral magic needed for
citizens to be defeasibly obligated to offer reasonable help in the enforcement of
dumb but not illiberal laws. What’s more, officials could not use gratitude as a
basis to enforce such dumb laws against others, since, like promises, gratitude
based duties cannot create a moral requirement to do something that would
otherwise be morally dubious, like enforcing a dumb criminal law against
someone who doesn’t otherwise have a real grounds for fidelity to that criminal
law.

Conclusion
I should close by providing a potential avenue of optimism for despots. If it
turns out that the offender (our earlier example of Peter Promise is a good
illustration) has voluntarily accepted the yoke of the despot’s dumb but not
illiberal laws and the official tasked with punishing Peter Promise is someone
who has voluntarily thrust himself into a position to punish (modestly and based
on strong and reasonably secured evidence), then both parties (in this admittedly
stylized example) have viable grounds for political obligation to each other even
if they are outside a liberal democracy.
Those are probably rare cases. More frequently, I suspect, we have situations in
wicked regimes where in fact there is little grounds for thinking citizens have
pro tanto moral obligations to conform to the dumb but not illiberal laws of their
polity. Similarly, there will be grounds for skepticism toward the view that
officials should, as a matter of pro tanto moral obligation, enforce these DBNI
laws against their fellow citizens, notwithstanding any oaths they may have
taken.
In any event, the main thing I have shown (or at least tried to sketch) is that
one’s moral obligations vis-à-vis criminal laws in wicked regimes need to be
filtered through more general accounts of political obligation, and this has
ramifications as much for citizens as it does for officials.

